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The Afterlives of Post-War Japanese Prime Ministers
Hugo Dobson a and Caroline Rose b
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ABSTRACT
Despite growing interest over the last 20 years in the position and
power of the Japanese prime minister, what he does after resign-
ing from this position has been overlooked in the extant litera-
tures in both English and Japanese. This is unfortunate because, to
paraphrase former US President Bill Clinton, as an ex-leader “you
lose your power but not your inﬂuence.” This article represents the
ﬁrst attempt to explore what post-war Japanese prime ministers
have done after stepping down and what inﬂuence they have
continued to exert. It does so by providing an empirical overview
of the afterlives of Japan’s 33 post-war ex-prime ministers before
then discussing the beneﬁts and shortcomings of applying the
comparative, conceptual literature on the role of former leaders in
Western democracies to the speciﬁc case of Japan. After providing
the necessary justiﬁcation, it then focuses on three detailed and
illuminating case studies of Nakasone Yasuhiro, Murayama
Tomiichi and Fukuda Yasuo. It argues that Japanese prime minis-
ters continue to exert inﬂuence in several informal ways.
KEYWORDS
Japan; prime minister;
ex-leaders; power; inﬂuence;
informal politics
Daylight has long faded
but until it is time to die
cicadas keep singing
Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro
On December 26, 2012 Abe Shinzo returned to the post of prime minister of Japan, a
position that he vacated in September 2007 after what was perceived to be a failed one-
year term in oﬃce. In doing so, he became the only post-Occupation prime minister to
serve a second non-consecutive term and has, since then, proved to be a much more
durable and successful prime minister than his ﬁrst term in oﬃce suggested. As a result,
scholarly and popular attention has focused upon the diﬀerences between Abe 1.0 and
Abe 2.0, particularly in terms of the strengthened executive position of the prime
minister and Japan’s more proactive role in the world (Hughes 2015; Dobson 2017;
George Mulgan 2017). However, there is an aspect of this comeback story that has been
overlooked and revolves around the simple question of “where are they now?”
Biographies, autobiographies, memoirs and biopics are replete with formative experi-
ences and coverage of leaders’ time in power but are often silent when it comes to the
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period after leaving oﬃce. Having been largely written oﬀ after resigning in September
2007, the example of Abe demonstrates that political obituaries should never be written
too early.
This silence on the subject of what leaders do beyond the point of their departure
from oﬃce is unfortunate for several reasons and raises important questions. First, one
of the inescapable truths of politics is that all leaders eventually become former leaders
and ignoring this period of a leader’s life misses out not only on academic opportunities
to ﬂesh out the complete biography of a leader’s experience but also practical oppor-
tunities for future administrations to beneﬁt from their expertise. Theakston (2006, 448)
has written that “[f]ormer prime ministers are members of a small, exclusive club.”
However, as Jack (2007) has argued, the topic of former leaders has increased in
salience over recent years and this trend is set to continue: “growing numbers of
successful politicians are leaving oﬃce younger, more energetic, keen to do more in
the future, propelled by their recent predecessors‚ precedents and increased chances to
consolidate their legacies and to continue to make a diﬀerence.” In light of this
emerging trend, this article represents the ﬁrst attempt in the various extant literatures
to present the narrative of this inescapable truth, highlight these experiences and
identify this expertise in the case of the Japanese prime minister.
Second, the question of what former leaders do after leaving oﬃcial positions of
power leads us to look at the unoﬃcial and informal aspects of politics. Pike (2000, 281)
deﬁnes informal politics as “interpersonal activities stemming from a tacitly accepted,
but unenunciated, matrix of political attitudes existing outside the framework of legal
government, constitutions, bureaucratic constructs and similar institutions.” In the
same book, Dittmer (2000, 292) argues that “informal politics consists of the use of
nonlegitimate means (albeit not necessarily illegal) to pursue public ends.” In a similar
vein, “marginal diplomacy” has been highlighted as “the performance of quasi-diplo-
matic functions of intelligence, promotion, and negotiation in the national interest by
persons lacking the status of diplomatic representatives, and hence the degree of legal
privilege and immunity accorded to oﬃcially accredited diplomatic agents” (Johnston
1970–1971, 470). This desire among political scientists to look beyond the “usual
suspects” of formal state and even non-state actors, such as non-governmental organi-
sations and international civil society, and instead pay attention to these informal
aspects of politics and power and the roles played by a range of informal actors has
intensiﬁed over recent years. These actors are now described as “hyper-empowered
individuals” – a term that can range from celebrity diplomats to academic networks to
political spouses (Cooper 2008, 2015; Dobson 2012a; Cross 2013). As will be argued
below, Japanese former prime ministers provide a hitherto overlooked but pertinent
case study of the inﬂuence of unoﬃcial and informal political actors in a country that
has traditionally been regarded as placing particular emphasis on the role of informal
political channels.
Third, although traditionally portrayed as weak, short-lived, lacking in resources and
ultimately occupying a less inﬂuential position than in other countries, there has been a
concomitant increase over the last 20 years in the attention paid to the Japanese prime
minister and the power he exerts (see Neary 1996; Edström 1996). Shinoda’s work
(2000), in particular, identiﬁes the power resources available to prime ministers and
illustrates how they instrumentalise them to achieve their objectives. Takayasu (2001)
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takes a similar tack in arguing that although a number of articles in the current
constitution are often identiﬁed as acting as constraints on prime-ministerial power,
they may not be as restraining as has been believed. Rather, taking the 1973 oil crisis as
an example, he outlines a range of other power resources and channels of inﬂuence,
including bilateral meetings with ministers and private secretaries’ networks, that Prime
Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to use to inﬂuence the policymaking process. Others
have highlighted the strengthening of the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce (Shinoda 2007), the
presidentialisation of Japanese politics (Krauss and Nyblade 2005), and the increasing
importance of the media to enhance public image and approval (Kabashima and Steel
2007). So, once regarded as largely irrelevant, the prime minister is ﬁrmly back on the
radar of observers of Japanese politics. Yet, his afterlife and post-premiership inﬂuence
have not received similar attention – a gap this article seeks to ﬁll.
Now is an opportune time to explore the afterlives of former prime ministers in
Japan. The disruption of the revolving door of prime ministers, which lasted from 2006
to 2012, produced a new prime minister every year and prompted Brazilian President
Lula da Silva to joke at the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit that you say “‘good morning’
to one Japanese prime minister and ‘good afternoon’ to another” (cited in The Financial
Times, June 2, 2010). That period has come to an end. So, at the time of writing, if we
count Abe as an example of a former prime minister and not including caretaker prime
ministers, Japan has produced 33 former prime ministers in the post-war period of
which 13 are still alive. Table 1 outlines these former leaders and it is the ﬁnal column
that provides the temporal focus in answering the questions of what former prime
ministers in Japan do in the time after stepping down and what inﬂuence they exert,
formally or informally, domestically or internationally.
To these ends, this article marshals evidence from biographies, memoirs, interviews
with several living former prime ministers, newspaper reports and a range of secondary
sources. It is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview of the afterlives of former
prime ministers. Rather than follow a chronological order, which would be unnecessarily
rigid and descriptive, this overview is organised intuitively from continued political
engagement at various levels, via non-political activities to the pursuit of personal causes
and even seemingly trivial celebrity appearances. It then seeks to make sense of this
empirical contribution through reference to the conceptual and comparative literature on
ex-leaders in Western democracies. In particular, it applies the categorisation of former
UK prime ministers developed by Theakston (2006; 2010) and Theakston and De Vries
(2012) to the case of Japan, arguing that the framework oﬀers a useful lens through which
to view the afterlives of Japanese prime ministers, albeit with some modiﬁcation and the
addition of new categories. The article then justiﬁes the selection of and focuses on three
detailed and illuminating case studies of Nakasone Yasuhiro, Murayama Tomiichi and
Fukuda Yasuo, which demonstrate the continued importance of former prime ministers
and the informal inﬂuence they have exerted.
Former Prime Ministers in Japan
Although continuing to pursue a political career may not be the ﬁrst choice for every
former leader, it is the intuitive choice for many. As mentioned above, Abe is the only
“comeback kid” of post-Occupation politics by serving a second non-consecutive term
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as prime minister; however, he is not the ﬁrst politician to attempt this feat. Hashimoto
Ryutaro, who served as prime minister from 1996 to 1998, sought a return to the top
job in 2001 but lost the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership race and thereby the
position of prime minister to Koizumi Junichiro (Asahi Shinbun, April 24, 2001).
Several former prime ministers have stayed on in politics in one form or another. For
example, Hashimoto, Miyazawa Kiichi and Aso Taro all served in ministerial positions
of inﬂuence after stepping down (with Miyazawa lending his name as ﬁnance minister
to one pillar of Japan’s response to the Asian Economic Crisis). Alternatively, Kaifu
Toshiki continued his political career by defecting from the LDP in 1994 to lead the
opposition New Frontier Party brieﬂy before returning to the LDP fold in 2003 (The
Table 1. Former prime ministers in post-war Japan.
Name Born Party
Tenure as
prime
minister
Former prime
ministers alive
during tenure
Age at
leaving
oﬃce Died
Length of
post-
premiership
(years)
Higashikuni
Naruhiko
1887 Independent 1945 N/A 57 1990 45
Shidehara Kijuro 1872 Independent 1945–46 1 73 1951 5
Yoshida Shigeru 1878 Liberal/Democratic
Liberal Party
1946–47;
1948–54
2 (4) 68 (76) 1967 1 (13)
Katayama Tetsu 1887 Socialist 1947–48 3 60 1978 30
Ashida Hitoshi 1887 Democratic 1948 4 60 1959 11
Hatoyama Ichiro 1883 Democratic/
LDP
1954–56 4 72 1959 3
Ishibashi Tanzan 1884 LDP 1956–57 5 72 1973 16
Kishi Nobusuke 1896 LDP 1957–60 6 63 1987 27
Ikeda Hayato 1899 LDP 1960–64 5 64 1965 1
Sato Eisaku 1901 LDP 1964–72 6 71 1975 3
Tanaka Kakuei 1918 LDP 1972–74 5 56 1993 19
Miki Takeo 1907 LDP 1974–76 5 69 1988 12
Fukuda Takeo 1905 LDP 1976–78 5 73 1995 17
Ohira Masayoshi 1910 LDP 1978–80 5 70 1980 0
Suzuki Zenko 1911 LDP 1980–82 5 71 2004 22
Nakasone
Yasuhiro
1918 LDP 1982–87 6 69 – 30+
Takeshita Noboru 1924 LDP 1987–89 6 65 2000 11
Uno Sosuke 1922 LDP 1989 6 66 1998 9
Kaifu Toshiki 1931 LDP 1989–91 7 60 – 26+
Miyazawa Kiichi 1919 LDP 1991–93 7 73 2007 14
Hosokawa
Morihiro
1938 JNP 1993–94 8 56 – 23+
Hata Tsutomu 1935 Renewal 1994 8 58 – 23+
Murayama
Tomiichi
1924 Socialist 1994–96 9 71 – 21+
Hashimoto
Ryutaro
1937 LDP 1996–98 9 61 2006 8
Obuchi Keizo 1937 LDP 1998–2000 9 62 2000 0
Mori Yoshiro 1937 LDP 2000–01 9 63 – 16+
Koizumi Junichiro 1942 LDP 2001–06 9 64 – 11+
Abe Shinzo 1954 LDP 2006–07;
2012–?
8 (12) 53 (N/A) – 5 (N/A)
Fukuda Yasuo 1936 LDP 2007–08 8 72 – 9+
Aso Taro 1940 LDP 2008–09 9 69 – 8+
Hatoyama Yukio 1947 DPJ 2009–10 10 63 – 7+
Kan Naoto 1946 DPJ 2010–11 11 64 – 6+
Noda Yoshihiko 1957 DPJ 2011–12 12 55 – 5+
Note: Caretaker prime ministers are not included. Numbers in brackets refer to second term in oﬃce. Correct as of
October 23, 2017.
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Japan Times, November 18, 2003). Hatoyama Yukio supported his ally Ozawa Ichiro in
an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to unseat his successor as prime minister, Kan
Naoto (Asahi Shinbun, September 15, 2010). Hosokawa Morihiro sought a diﬀerent
political oﬃce when he ran unsuccessfully for Mayor of Tokyo in 2014 largely on an
anti-nuclear power, single issue platform (Yomiuri Shinbun, February 10, 2014). Many
former prime ministers have continued to serve in the House of Representatives or
House of Councillors. The most notable examples are Miki Takeo, who served as prime
minister for only two years from 1974 to 1976 but for 50 years in total as a member of
the House of Representatives and received the rare honour after his death of a bust
placed in the Japanese Diet building (Asahi Shinbun, June 22, 1990). His protégé Kaifu
was prime minister from 1989 to 1991 and served for 49 years in total as a representa-
tive of his constituency until the LDP’s electoral disaster of 2009. Although admirable
for their longevity, elderly parliamentarians are not to everyone’s tastes and despite his
desire to continue to serve, Nakasone was eventually forced to step down by Koizumi in
2003 as part of his eﬀorts to rejuvenate the LDP by introducing an age limit for electoral
candidates (Yomiuri Shinbun, October 28, 2003).
A more common way to continue playing a role in politics is within the factional
system. Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka, Miki, Fukuda Takeo, Suzuki Zenko, Nakasone,
Takeshita Noboru, Hashimoto and Mori Yoshiro all operated within their respective
factions and exerted inﬂuence to varying degrees behind the scenes after stepping down
as prime minister. The more powerful factional leaders have played the role of king-
makers or shadow shoguns. For example, it has been argued that Takeshita’s inﬂuence
was in fact greater after his resignation as prime minister and the selection of each of
his successors with the exceptions of Hosokawa and Hata reﬂect this inﬂuence up until
his death in 2000 (Anon 1999). Moreover, there has been much discussion of the case of
Tanaka and his inﬂuence over subsequent administrations can be neatly captured in the
term “Tanakasone” that was used to describe Nakasone’s administration (Johnson 1986;
Babb 2000; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 26, 1983).
At the other end of the spectrum exist the prime ministers who have done little
related to politics in retirement, either through choice or as a result of circumstances.
Both Ohira Masayoshi and Obuchi Keizo fell ill while in oﬃce and died soon after. A
number of prime ministers did not live long after stepping down: Shidehara Kijuro,
who made his name as foreign minister in the pre-war period, was brought out of
retirement to serve as prime minister during the Occupation period but only lived for a
further ﬁve years after resigning in 1946 during which time he served as Speaker of the
House of Representatives and died in that post. Ikeda Hayato resigned because of
cancer and died less than a year later. Hatoyama Ichiro and Sato Eisaku both lived
for a further three years. Some former prime ministers have abandoned politics in
favour of a completely unrelated career. For example, the shortest serving prime
minister but longest living former prime minister, Higashikuni Naruhiko, was a mem-
ber of the Imperial family and only ever regarded as an interim leader who could sign
the instrument of surrender and oversee the transition to the US Occupation. He
resigned on October 9, 1945, sought to renounce his imperial status and became a
commoner. The Occupation reforms ensured this with the abolition of the aristocracy
and thereafter he operated several private businesses, from second-hand goods to
dressmaking, with little success before then establishing a religious sect that was
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subsequently outlawed by the occupying forces. He would later found the Chiba
Institute of Technology and publish his wartime diaries and memoirs before dying in
January 1990 aged 102. Uno Sosuke represents a former prime minister who retired
into quiet anonymity engaged mostly in personal hobbies of painting, music and poetry
after he was forced to resign when an extra-marital aﬀair with a geisha came to light.
Some, but not many, former prime ministers have gone on to engage in digniﬁed
and non-partisan public service. After resigning in 1954, Yoshida Shigeru retired to his
family residence in Oiso, Kanagawa Prefecture and quietly spent the remaining 13 years
of life as a modern-day genro (an unoﬃcial title given in pre-war Japan to a retired elder
statesman), welcoming visitors and foreign dignitaries and dispensing advice when not
writing his memoirs and histories of Japan. Two years after retiring and one year before
he died, Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for representing the people’s
will for peace and for signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
in 1970. Fukuda Takeo was a founding member of the Interaction Council (IAC),
which was established in 1983 to bring together former heads of state from across the
world with the purpose of raising awareness of global issues, and was followed some
years later by his son, Fukuda Yasuo, who took up membership in 2009. Murayama was
made an ad hoc member of the IAC in 2010 to coincide with that year’s plenary session
held in Hiroshima that produced the Hiroshima Declaration on the elimination of
nuclear weapons.
Several former prime ministers have continued to pursue a personal cause. Although
his post-premiership was non-existent, the pet policies and causes of Ohira, especially
the Paciﬁc Basin Community Concept, were promoted through the establishment of the
Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation ﬁve years after his death that continues to
operate today. Murayama has been closely associated with the issue of the comfort
women and served as president of the Asian Women’s Fund until it was wound down
in 2007. Hosokawa’s unsuccessful campaign in the Tokyo Mayoral elections of 2014
focused on an anti-nuclear ticket, with the public support of Koizumi who broke a
relatively long period of silence since retiring. Aso was appointed in 2011 as an anime
envoy to China by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a role that resonated with his
own soft power initiatives when in oﬃce, such as establishing the International Manga
Award (MOFA 2017). In addition, he sought to improve sports facilities ahead of a
successful bid to host the 2020 Olympics, in which Mori continues to play a central role
as president of the organising committee. As will be discussed in more detail below,
Fukuda Yasuo has sought to promote reconciliation in Northeast Asia by taking on
various roles at the bilateral and regional levels.
Some ex-prime ministers have sought to burnish their own reputations or reverse
history’s judgement on them. Tanaka represents an example of a former prime
minister clearly wanting to salvage his reputation from perennial allegations and
eventual arrest on charges of corruption after resigning in 1974. Nakasone has
engaged in reputation-burnishing activities through the Institute for International
Policy Studies, which he founded in 1988 and functions to continue the cause of
constitutional revision. Abe has done something similar in relation to his ﬁrst term
in oﬃce through his second term in oﬃce. Seeking to set the record straight with
political memoirs is not common in Japan but Kaifu’s 2010 book Seiji to Kane
(Politics and Money) sought to address the perception of him as a weak prime
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minister. Similarly, Kan continued to seek the abandonment of nuclear power as well
as exoneration both at home and abroad from his handling of the triple disasters of
the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 and resulting Fukushima
nuclear meltdown (Kan 2012, 2017).
Other ex-prime ministers have maintained their reputation and status in retirement
through their acolytes and protégés. For example, Ikeda and Sato were disciples of
Yoshida. Ikeda mentored Miyazawa, Sato was also a follower of Kishi, Kaifu owed
allegiance to Miki, Hata Tsutomu was an acolyte of Tanaka, and Obuchi of Takeshita to
the extent that he was accorded an unfortunate and scatological nickname (The
Economist, July 30, 1998).
This kind of reputational burnishing and legacy building can be conducted much
closer to home because of the prevalence of dynastic politicians in Japan (Asako et al.
2015). For example, Yoshida, Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi, Tanaka, Fukuda Takeo, Suzuki,
Nakasone, Takeshita, Miyazawa, Hata, Hashimoto, Obuchi and Koizumi all have/had
children, grandchildren, siblings or nephews who pursued political careers of varying
success but in the process burnished his/her father’s, grandfather’s, brother’s or uncle’s
reputation and legacy.
Serving as a leader of any country can confer celebrity status and this has been the
case in Japan whether it be Hosokawa training as a potter and publicly exhibiting his
work, Koizumi lending his vocal talents to the role of Ultraman King in Mega Monster
Battle Ultra Galaxy: The Movie, or Hatoyama playing the role of the ﬁrst female
president of the US in retirement in a stage musical (Hosokawa 2008; Nikkan Sports,
September 29, 2014). One other option in Western democracies for former leaders is to
seek ﬁnancial reward resulting from their status through the international lecture circuit
like Clinton and the UK’s Tony Blair. However, this trend can only be tenuously
observed in Japan and may be the result of Japanese prime ministers being of little
interest to an international audience or having already secured a level of personal
wealth, which is a prerequisite for a successful political career.
Making Sense of Former Leaders
In attempting to make sense of this initial overview of the afterlives of Japan’s prime
ministers, the comparative literature is of some, limited, assistance. The former US
president has traditionally dominated the literature on ex-leaders. This is unsurprising
in that “[a]n ex-President. . .occupies a unique position in our national life. As one of a
select few he has held the highest position in the gift of the people, an oﬃce with which,
perhaps, none other in the world is comparable for power and inﬂuence” (Sheldon
1925, 3). To this end, several works have provided purely descriptive but nevertheless
informative accounts of the post-resignation lives of ex-presidents across time from
George Washington to Bill Clinton (Martin 1951; Clark 1985; Cunningham 1989;
Updegrove 2006). Other works have explored the post-presidencies of individual ex-
presidents including Theodore Roosevelt (O’Toole 2005; Morris 2010) and Jimmy
Carter (Brinkley 1998). However, much of this literature lacks an analytical focus and
is purely descriptive. Sheldon (1925) represents an early attempt to tease out some
categories amongst these post-presidencies along the lines of quiet seclusion, has-been,
resuming a previous profession, becoming a national ﬁgure, oﬀering wisdom and
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advice, or engaging in (or rising above) partisan politics. Others have proposed similar
categories with diﬀerent degrees of emphasis (Hecht 1976; Schenker 1982; Schaller and
Williams 2003; Skidmore 2004; Benardo and Weiss 2009). Belenky (1999) provides a
more useful categorisation by highlighting six recurrent models of ex-presidents: (i)
“still ambitious,” who hope for a return to power; (ii) “exhausted volcanoes,” who do
little if anything after stepping down; (iii) “political dabblers,” who continue to play an
unoﬃcial role that can be either supportive or unsupportive of their party or the
government of the day; (iv) “ﬁrst citizens,” who are similar to elder statesmen and
use their high proﬁles to engage in honourable activities; (v) “embracers of a cause,”
who promote an issue close to their hearts; and (vi) “seekers of vindication,” who want
to communicate their own version of events.
The chief weakness in using the literature on ex-presidents to explore former
Japanese prime ministers is the disparity between presidential and parliamentary
systems. US presidents know that they will serve either one or two four-year terms in
oﬃce and can thus anticipate the time they will step down. Prime ministers cannot do
this and, because they are not directly elected, will often have the option of returning to
the backbenches and continuing as a parliamentarian after stepping down.
So, it would appear more logical to look to similar parliamentary systems in the
comparative literature, such as the Westminster system. In his article on UK prime
ministers’ afterlives, Theakston (2006, 449–455) employs the categories of: (i) “in
government oﬃce after being prime minister” by serving as a minister in another
prime minister’s cabinet; (ii) “honours” including serving in the House of Lords; (iii)
“setting the record straight” by writing memoirs; (iv) “money matters,” or securing
ﬁnancial solvency in their retirement; and (v) “outlive the bastards” by recovering from
the exigencies of the position, attending to health and aging issues and not succumbing
to illness for as long as possible.
Theakston adapts these categories slightly in his book-length treatment (2010) of UK
prime ministers from Walpole to Blair, with reference to Belenky’s (1999) categorisa-
tion of former US presidents mentioned above. Theakston (2010, 4–13, 226–237)
highlights the categories of: “back in government oﬃce after being prime minister”;
“other political and public oﬃce”; “health and age factors”; “money matters,” “hon-
ours,” and “putting pen to paper.” Clearly, a number of Belenky’s and Theakston’s
categories overlap, such as “back in oﬃce after being prime minister”/“still ambitious,”
“exhausted volcanoes”/“health and age factors,” and “putting pen to paper”/“seekers of
vindication.” Theakston’s category of “other political and public oﬃce” includes and
conﬂates aspects of Belenky’s three categories of “political dabblers,” “ﬁrst citizens” and
“embracers of a cause.” So, regardless of political system, these appear to be universal
categories. Theakston and de Vries’s edited volume (2012) expands the UK-speciﬁc
analysis in a more comparative and much-needed direction by applying these categories
to other parliamentary and presidential systems, including the US, Canada, Australia,
Germany, France, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Israel, with the
noticeable exception of Japan.
The overview of the activities of former Japanese prime ministers provided above
highlights the fact that some of these categories are simply not appropriate to the
Japanese case. On the one hand, “honours” cannot be applied as the peerage was
abolished during the US Occupation and an elected House of Councillors introduced.
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Thus, unlike the UK’s House of Lords, to which former UK prime ministers are
appointed, Japanese ex-prime ministers are denied an oﬃcial platform to continue
exerting inﬂuence, pursue a cause or share their expertise. Lacking an oﬃcial route,
they have tended to seek out alternative pathways to continue exerting some kind of
inﬂuence, as will be discussed below in more detail. On the other hand, “money
matters” is equally not applicable because Japanese prime ministers have already
secured the necessary resources to pursue a political career prior to becoming prime
minister, as mentioned above.
So, excluding these categories and taking the more nuanced and disaggregated cate-
gories outlined by Belenky, Table 2 demonstrates that to an extent the Japanese case maps
neatly onto this categorisation. For example, many Japanese ex-prime ministers remain
clearly ambitious to serve in some kind of oﬃcial political oﬃce either in opposition or
usually in government as a result of LDP dominance. However, at the same time, Table 2
reveals some peculiarities. For example, “exhausted volcanoes” is heavily populated and
this is because, until recently, Japanese prime ministers have historically and compara-
tively tended to be older than their counterparts in other countries. Even more heavily
populated is the category of “political dabblers” and of course this is a result of the
factional and personal nature of Japanese politics. At the same time, it is also a result of a
structural peculiarity of the Japanese case. Unlike most Western democracies where a
president or prime minister resigns at the point his/her party loses power, the majority of
Japanese prime ministers have resigned but the LDP has remained in power. A Japanese
spin on this category is the modern-day genro, as seen in Yoshida’s casting of himself in
this role of oﬀering advice (both solicited and unsolicited), and to a large degree
Nakasone has behaved in similar fashion, as discussed below.
However, these categories do not fully capture all aspects of the afterlives of Japanese
prime ministers. The Japanese case suggests the addition of three further categories that are
captured in Table 3: (i) “acolytes and protégés,” who continue to burnish an ex-prime
minister’s reputation; (ii) “family aﬀair” with a similar emphasis on maintaining reputation
through generational politics; and (iii) “celebrity,” which can be used as political capital but
is sometimes simply for the sake of it. Belenky’s and Theakston’s approaches do not allow us
to make sense of these activities and it is only an understanding of the speciﬁc or ampliﬁed
aspects of the Japanese political system that can help us. These will be highlighted below.
It is the categories of “political dabblers,” “ﬁrst citizens” and “embracers of a cause”
that attract several ex-prime ministers regardless of their position on the political
Table 2. Categorisation of former Japanese prime ministers.
Still ambitious
Exhausted
volcanoes Political dabblers First citizens Embracers of a cause Seekers of vindication
Abe Higashikuni Fukuda T. Fukuda T. Aso Kaifu
Aso Hatoyama I. Hashimoto Fukuda Y. Fukuda Y. Kan
Hashimoto Ikeda Kishi Murayama Hosokawa Nakasone
Hatoyama Y. Obuchi Miki Nakasone Mori Tanaka
Hosokawa Ohira Mori Sato Murayama
Kaifu Sato Nakasone Yoshida Nakasone
Miyazawa Shidehara Suzuki Ohira
Uno Takeshita
Tanaka
Source: Authors’ application of categories from Belenky (1999) and Theakston (2010).
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spectrum and relate most closely to the discussion of unoﬃcial and informal politics
mentioned in the introductory section. The case studies that follow explore the post-
premierships of three prime ministers who appear in two or more of these categories,
Nakasone, Fukuda and Murayama. They identify all three as embracers of causes (albeit
diﬀerent ones) and ﬁrst citizens (albeit aspiring ones) but Nakasone as a political
dabbler for the most part. The case studies outline their activities, degree of success
in playing these unoﬃcial and informal roles and the inﬂuence exerted.
Political Dabblers, First Citizens and Embracers of a Cause as Informal
Political Actors
The post-premiership activities of Nakasone, Fukuda and Murayama are worth
exploring in more detail for several other reasons. First, their selection covers sig-
niﬁcant periods of time with Nakasone serving as prime minister in the 1980s,
Murayama in the 1990s, and Fukuda in the 2000s. Second, they represent the full
range of the mainstream political spectrum with Nakasone as the traditional, nation-
alist conservative on the right, Fukuda more right of centre and Murayama on the
left. Finally, these are three ex-prime ministers that have been active and written
about since stepping down, unlike Uno or Hata for example, and as a result provide a
paper trail for the researcher, but one that is neither overwhelming nor over-
researched as is the case with Tanaka. Thus, taken together, they capture a signiﬁcant
and wide range of post-premiership activities and, as mentioned above, all ﬁt into
some or all of the categories discussed above, namely political dabblers, embracers of
a cause and ﬁrst citizens. Nakasone is noteworthy not just because of his longevity but
because of his active involvement in the business of politics and foreign policy since
stepping down as prime minister 30 years ago, making him part political dabbler, part
embracer of a cause as well as, brieﬂy, aspiring ﬁrst citizen. Fukuda and Murayama
also merit further attention as they were largely regarded as short-lived, even failed,
prime ministers. Their active post-premierships, however, suggest a path towards
redemption through their embrace of various causes and (aspiring) ﬁrst citizen
roles. The following sections describe the activities of each of these three former
prime ministers in turn, before making sense of their activities in light of the
literature on informal political actors.
Table 3. New categories of former Japanese prime ministers.
Acolytes and protégés Family aﬀair Celebrity
Yoshida (Ikeda, Sato) Yoshida Hosokawa
Kishi (Sato) Hatoyama I. Murayama
Ikeda (Miyazawa) Kishi Hatoyama Y.
Miki (Kaifu) Tanaka Koizumi
Tanaka (Hata, Nakasone) Fukuda T.
Takeshita (Obuchi) Suzuki
Nakasone
Takeshita
Miyazawa
Hata
Hashimoto
Obuchi
Koizumi
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Nakasone Yasuhiro
Nakasone was born on May 27, 1918 in Gunma Prefecture and graduated from Tokyo
Imperial University in 1941. He was ﬁrst elected to the House of Representatives in
1947 for the Democratic Party. He served under Kishi as Director-General of the
Science and Technology Agency, as Transport Minister and Director-General of the
Defence Agency under Sato, Minister of Trade under Tanaka, LDP Secretary General
under Miki and Director-General of the Administrative Management Agency under
Suzuki. At the time of writing, he is Japan’s oldest living former prime minister and his
post-premiership activities have been rich and varied as demonstrated by his inclusion
in all three categories of political dabbler, ﬁrst citizen and embracer of a cause.
Nakasone is probably best remembered for being one of the more charismatic and
dynamic premiers, and his major achievements include bolstering the relationship with
the US through his friendship with Ronald Reagan (the “Ron-Yasu” relationship).
Domestically, he attempted to enact a series of bold reforms, some more successful
than others. While he managed to privatise the railways during his time in oﬃce, his
education and administrative reforms took longer. He is also associated with trying to
settle post-war accounts in East Asia, but he contributed to the emergence of the history
problem in Japan–China, and Japan–Korea relations with his controversial visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. He resigned on November 6, 1987 having reached the end of
the maximum term that he could serve.
During a short period out of the LDP between 1989 and 1991, Nakasone appeared to be
carving out a ﬁrst citizen role through various high-proﬁle overseas missions. For example,
in similar fashion to a number of former leaders, including the UK’s Edward Heath and
Germany’s Willy Brandt, he met with Saddam Hussein in November 1990 in order to
secure the release of 72 Japanese hostages taken after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait earlier
that year and to urge Saddam to continue dialogue with the US to avoid war (Nakasone
1996, 591–597). He also joined a delegation to the Soviet Union in January 1989, alongside
former French President Giscard d’Estaing and former US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, to meet President Gorbachev (Hattori 2015, 288). On returning to the LDP
fold in 1991 as senior adviser (partly on the back of his successful visit to Iraq), Nakasone
visited China to establish the Japan-China Youth Exchange Centre and later visitedMoscow
to discuss the possibility of a peace treaty with President Yeltsin (Hattori 2015, 288).
He did not, however, develop this ﬁrst citizen role, focussing his attention instead on
party matters and assuming a “kingmaker” role reminiscent of Tanaka. He states in his
memoirs, for example, that he had some inﬂuence over the choice of Takeshita as his
successor, and on Takeshita’s policies on consumption tax. Similarly, he claims to have
had inﬂuence over the choice of Uno in discussion with Takeshita (Nakasone 1996,
591). During the break-up of the LDP at the end of the Miyazawa administration,
Nakasone is quoted by Hayasaka (1994, 161–162) as saying:
From now on, I will control the LDP behind the curtain. I will put together the Watanabe,
Miyazawa and Mitsuzuka factions and lend a helping hand to Takeshita who is in a great
quandary. And then I will establish an encircling net against Ozawa who is a dangerous
revolutionary element that will jeopardize the present LDP structure. He must be destroyed.
The extent to which Nakasone was able to control the LDP in the way he described is
debatable. While his inﬂuence within the party was greater in the years immediately after
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he stepped down as prime minister, this later diminished. Nakasone had passed leader-
ship of his own faction over to Watanabe Michio in 1989, but on Watanabe’s death in
1995 the faction split as divisions opened up between the old guard (Nakasone,
Sakurauchi Yoshio and Murakami Masakuni) and the new (Yamasaki Taku). The faction
split in 1998 and Nakasone’s group merged with Kamei Shizuka’s group. This weakening
of Nakasone’s factional power meant that, except for the ill-fated Uno, the Nakasone
faction produced no further prime ministers after the Recruit scandal (Hattori 2015, 294).
This did not stop Nakasone, however, from attempting to steer party matters, though not
always with successful outcomes. When Hashimoto became prime minister in 1996,
Nakasone had high expectations for his ambitious reform programme. In 1997, however,
Nakasone’s pressure on Hashimoto to appoint Sato Koko, a member of the Nakasone
group, as head of the Management and Co-ordination Agency in a cabinet re-shuﬄe led
to a weakening of the Hashimoto government when the public protested against Sato’s
previous involvement (and criminal conviction) in the Lockheed scandal (see Shinoda
1999). TheHashimoto cabinet’s support rate plummeted as a result, and after heavy losses
in the July 1998 Upper House elections, he stood down.
By 1997, Nakasone had become the fourth Diet member in Japanese history to serve
for 50 years and only the third Diet member (along with former prime ministers Saionji
Kinmochi and Sato Eisaku) to receive the prestigious Supreme Order of the
Chrysanthemum. Showing no signs of heading towards retirement, Nakasone said in
2000 that it was “his duty to serve the nation until he dies, as he pledged as a Japanese
military oﬃcer in World War II” (The Japan Times, May 12, 2000). He even penned his
own haiku, quoted at the beginning of this article, that describes his wish not to retire
(Hattori 2015, 283). In 2003, however, he clashed with then Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichiro who, in seeking to bring about party reform, put an upper age limit of 73 on
candidates for proportional representation districts that included former prime minis-
ters who had previously been exempt (The Japan Times, August 26, 2016). The change
to the rules also hit 84-year-old Miyazawa Kiichi, who immediately stood down, but
Nakasone felt deeply insulted and insisted on a televised face-oﬀ with Koizumi during
which he accused him of being disrespectful (Hattori 2015, 296; The New York Times,
October 24, 2003).
Despite being forced out of the party, Nakasone continued to keep a watchful eye on
the LDP, and political developments in general, regularly commenting on the problems
he perceived. He had a penchant for identifying the shortcomings of his LDP successors
including Koizumi, Aso and Fukuda (see Nakasone 2008; Mainichi Shinbun, September
3, 2008). Moreover, he did not restrict his criticisms to LDP prime ministers, speaking
out about DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama and on the problems facing Japan in the wake
of Prime Minister Kan’s handling of the Fukushima disaster (Nakasone and Umehara
2010; Sankei Shinbun, May 13, 2011).
Beyond party matters, Nakasone has also promoted multiple causes through his
numerous publications that include memoirs, interviews and reﬂections on Japan’s
political history, current domestic and international aﬀairs, and the nature of leadership
(Nakasone 1992, 1996). Through the think tank he established in 1988 with the co-
operation of then Prime Minister Takeshita – the Institute for International Policy
Studies (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujo) – he has been able to pursue his ongoing interests in
issues such as constitutional revision, educational reform and administrative reform
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(see Maslow 2013; Abb and Koellner 2015). He has also been personally involved in
LDP government moves to consider constitutional revision. For example, he was asked
to head up one of the subcommittees considering a revised draft of the constitution in
2005 (The Japan Times, January 25, 2005), and continues to be a vocal critic of the
current constitution for its lack of “values and principles based on Japan’s own tradi-
tions” (The Japan Times, May 3, 2015).
Murayama Tomiichi
Born on March 3, 1924 in Oita Prefecture, Murayama graduated from Meiji University
in 1946 before he joined the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and was elected to Oita City and
Prefectural Councils. He was ﬁrst elected to the House of Representatives in 1972 and
would be elected eight times. He took over the leadership of the JSP in 1993 and became
only the second socialist prime minister (after Katayama) in June 1994 via a marriage of
convenience between the LDP, JSP and New Party Sakigake (which had broken away
from the LDP the previous year). He announced his resignation suddenly on January 5,
1996 at the age of 71 after exhausting himself (Yakushiji 2012). In contrast to Nakasone
and Fukuda, he represents a rare example of a prime minister not being succeeded by a
member of his own political party and thus the opportunities for him to assume the role
of political dabbler by, for example, inﬂuencing the choice of his successor, Hashimoto,
were limited.
Murayama was heavily tested during his time in oﬃce, having made a surprising and
damaging U-turn on the JSP’s longstanding position on the Self-Defence Forces and the
US-Japan Security Treaty, and having to deal with crises such as the long-running jusen
(housing loan companies) issue of non-performing loans, the Kobe earthquake of
January 1995, and the sarin gas attack of March 1995 – his handling of which was
severely criticised. A more positive legacy was the Murayama Statement (Murayama
danwa) issued on August 15, 1995 to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war.
The statement, though highly controversial within the ruling coalition, not least within
LDP ranks, nonetheless provided a benchmark against which successive prime minis-
ters would be measured when issuing apologies (Sakata and Murayama 2009).
After resigning as prime minister, Murayama was reappointed as leader of the JSP
(later renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan), but stepped down in September
1996 to be succeeded by Doi Takako. He published a collection of interviews with
fellow politician Tsujimoto Kiyomi in 1998 entitled So ja no (Well, Let’s See) that
reﬂected upon his time as prime minister. However, he was generally regarded as
something of an exhausted volcano and eventually retired from politics on June 2, 2000.
However, he was able to aspire to the status of ﬁrst citizen by assuming a highly
visible role in attempts to re-open normalisation talks with North Korea from 1999 to
2000. The decision to assume this role could possibly be read as a form of vindication
and a means of completing unﬁnished business from his time as prime minister when
there had been an attempt to open talks in October 1994 and March 1995. In any case,
taking the opportunity presented by the thaw in US–North Korean relations and
agreement surrounding US inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, Murayama
sought to organise and lead a non-partisan delegation to North Korea. The visit was
delayed several times during 1999 due to spikes in bilateral tensions but was eventually
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realised in December. The visit saw Murayama lay a wreath at the statue of Kim Il-Sung
and resulted in Japan lifting sanctions introduced in 1998 in protest at the North
Korean ballistic missile launch over Japan, as well as an agreement that normalisation
talks would re-commence by the end of the year. To support this negotiation process,
the non-governmental National Organisation for the Promotion of Normalisation
between Japan and North Korea was established in July 2000 headed by Murayama
who led a delegation to Pyongyang in November–December 2000. However, three
rounds of negotiations during 2000 failed to bring about the hoped-for normalisation,
getting bogged down in apology and compensation issues on the one hand (the North
Koreans rejected a statement along the lines of the 1995 Murayama Statement as
inadequate), and the rachi jiken issue (abduction of Japanese citizens by North
Korean agents) on the other hand (The Japan Times, December 10, 2000; NHK News,
November 30, 2000).
Murayama’s other main post-premiership role was as president of the Asian
Women’s Fund (AWF) from September 2000 until it was disbanded on March 31,
2007. The AWF was established in 1995 during his time as prime minster and
distributed 1.7 billion yen in total (1.2 billion from government and half a billion
from private sources), compensating approximately 360 women from Indonesia, the
Netherlands, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan “who underwent immeasurable
and painful experiences and suﬀered incurable physical and psychological wounds as
comfort women” (quoted in Kumagai 2014, 147). In addition, it distributed letters of
apology from the prime minister and private donors, and promoted regional educa-
tional and cultural activities as a means of atonement. A further legacy of the AWF was
the creation of a digital museum to document in both English and Japanese the fund’s
activities and the testimonies of many of the comfort women (The Japan Times,
September 28, 2007). However, from its inception, the AWF was the target of criticism
from many who rejected its private nature and restitution in place of explicit state
compensation alone. Lack of consistent leadership, poor administration, confusion as to
the relationship between the government’s and the people’s admission of responsibility,
and mismanagement of former comfort women’s expectations of the AMF’s eﬀorts
towards atonement have also been cited as factors contributing to its limited success
(Kumagai 2014, 121–128).
As the AWF approached disbandment, Murayama urged the government to con-
tinue to do more and acknowledged the criticisms levelled at the fund’s work:
I don’t think our projects – providing atonement money, and medical and welfare support
as well as sending letters of apology from the prime minister – will not [sic] cure the
damage that those women received. I will ask the government to provide them with further
care (The Japan Times, May 7, 2007).
Our relief measures and the letter of apology from prime ministers are not enough to cure
the suﬀerings of the victims, and maybe few people accepted them willingly (The Japan
Times, May 9, 2007).
Alongside these two salient if not entirely successful roles, Murayama’s other post-
premiership activities have further underscored his role as a ﬁrst citizen attempting
to address the history problem and promote the cause of Northeast Asian reconcilia-
tion. In 2005 he joined other former prime ministers in urging then Prime Minister
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Koizumi to “‘use extreme caution’ when deciding whether or not to visit the
Yasukuni shrine” (The Japan Times, June 8, 2005). He has visited China and South
Korea on several occasions to attend friendship association events or meet with
comfort women. His visit to South Korea in February 2014 was regarded as an
attempt to reignite high-level diplomacy (The Diplomat, February 15, 2014). He still
serves today as chair of the Japan-Vietnam Peace and Friendship Promotion Council
and an honorary advisor to the Japan-China Friendship Association. This latter role
has seen him collaborate with the China-Japan Friendship Association “to create an
‘atmosphere’ that will allow the two governments to engage in talks” (The Japan
Times, April 1, 2013).
Finally, Murayama has been particularly vocal in recent years on the ongoing
struggles over the comfort women issue and Abe Shinzo’s much-anticipated statement
made on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, acting as a persistent
advocate for Japan to address its past. For example, he criticised Abe’s anniversary
statement for lacking clarity (The Japan Times, August 16, 2015), but welcomed the
Japan–Korea agreement on the comfort women in December 2015 (The Japan Times,
December 30, 2015). He has upheld the eponymous Murayama Statement, stating that
“there is no need to change anything” (The Japan Times, April 1, 2013).
Fukuda Yasuo
Born on July 16, 1936 in Tokyo and graduating from Waseda University, Fukuda Yasuo
was, like his predecessor Abe Shinzo, a leader with a political heritage. Fukuda Takeo,
his father, served as prime minister from 1976 to 1978. In fact, the son served as an aide
to his father during this period having quit his position at Maruzen Petroleum but
returned to the business world thereafter. He was ﬁrst elected to the House of
Representatives in 1990 and served as Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Mori and
Koizumi administrations before resigning from the government over unpaid pension
contributions in May 2004.
After Abe’s resignation, Fukuda won the LDP presidential election on September 23,
2007 having proved to be a “consensus candidate.” Although regarded by some as a
caretaker prime minister, his domestic policies while in power included attempts to
tackle pension problems, health care reform and an economic stimulus package. On the
international level, he hosted a rare double of summits as chair of the Fourth Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD-IV) and the G8 Hokkaido-
Toyako Summit in May and July 2008. At the former, Fukuda pledged to double Japan’s
oﬃcial development assistance contributions to Africa by 2012; while at the latter, he
promoted Japan’s Cool Earth initiative (Dobson 2012b). He also continued his father’s
policies of engaging the Asian region and pursuing an “omni-directional” foreign
policy. In particular, he presided over the signing of the May 2008 Joint Statement on
the China–Japan “Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship Based on Common Strategic
Interests,” although the groundwork for this development had been put in place by
Abe and his foreign policy and national security advisor Yachi Shotaro. However,
Fukuda was constrained during his time in power as a result of opposition control of
the House of Councillors that resulted in deadlock in the Diet and the blocking of many
of the LDP’s legislative eﬀorts.
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Fukuda resigned unexpectedly on September 1, 2008 declaring that “[t]his is the
perfect timing to not cause people too much trouble” (cited in The New York Times,
September 1, 2008). However, the media’s reaction was critical, reﬂecting a general
feeling across society that Fukuda had been irresponsible in resigning (The Japan Times,
September 2, 2008). Fukuda retorted with uncharacteristic frankness when accused at a
press conference after resigning of running away from dealing with Japan’s problems,
saying “You said I sound detached, but I am able to look at myself objectively. I’m
diﬀerent from you” (Kantei 2008). The last sentence of this statement in Japanese
(anata to wa chigau n desu) became a “phrase of the year” as voted for by readers of
Shukan Bunshun, a popular weekly magazine.
Fukuda retained his Diet seat in the 2009 election amid fears that he might lose out
to the new DPJ candidate Miyake Yukiko. He continued in politics until the end of
2012, indicating in September his intention not to stand in the next election. During his
ﬁnal years as a Diet member, Fukuda followed in his father’s footsteps by taking on a
range of foreign aﬀairs-related roles, clearly something he relished (Interview with
Fukuda Yasuo, June 27, 2012). He acted as a special envoy during Aso’s premiership,
visiting the United Arab Emirates and Oman, and accompanying the emperor on his
visit to the US and Canada. He also attended the TICAD-IV interim meeting in
Botswana in March 2009 and in the same year visited Kenya. Both visits linked back
to Fukuda’s chairing of TICAD-IV and the G8 in 2008.
Fukuda’s appointments to the directorship or boards of various international and
regional non-governmental organisations attest not only to his desire to continue with
his long-held interests, but to explore new leadership opportunities and take on the
position of ﬁrst citizen. For example, he has taken on a number of formal and informal
roles that have enabled him to express his ideas on nuclear non-proliferation through
the InterAction Council from 2009, economic integration and development through his
directorship of the Boao Forum from 2010, sustainable development and human
security issues through the Asian Population and Development Association from
2012, and East Asian reconciliation in general through the Northeast Asia Trilateral
Forum (NATF) and the Genron-NPO Tokyo-Beijing Forum.1 His activities have
attracted a certain amount of positive attention, not least his Boao Forum directorship
and his attendance at the NATF meetings. But of particular note is his informal role in
facilitating a thaw in the tension between China and Japan that had been mounting over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu island issue since 2012.
Fukuda is generally considered to be one of China’s “old friends” (lao pengyou),
making regular visits to China or meeting the leadership at regional fora. In April 2010,
for example, he met then Vice-President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum and in August
2010 attended the opening ceremony of the Japan Pavilion at the Shanghai World Expo.
He also made a keynote speech at the Tokyo-Beijing Forum and has attended each year
since 2012, becoming a regular speaker and “top advisor” at this annual event that seeks
to promote co-operative relations. When the Senkaku/Diaoyu island issue began to
resurface in 2012, a meeting between Fukuda and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the
InterAction Council in May provided an opportunity for the Chinese side, in reference
to Ishihara Shintaro’s plans to purchase some of the islands, to ask that Japan take steps
“to prudently deal with troublesome issues” (China Daily, May 10, 2012). It is unclear
whether the Chinese expected Fukuda to pass the message back directly to the Noda
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administration, but for the Chinese side this was at least a useful and high-proﬁle
meeting to send a signal to the Japanese government (a message that was of course
reiterated during other meetings between Chinese leaders and Japanese visitors over the
next few months).2 Fukuda continued his normal round of attendance at various
forums during the rest of 2012 and 2013 and made speeches urging caution on the
part of both the Chinese and Japanese governments as bilateral tensions failed to ease.
In 2014 his role in Sino-Japanese rapprochement was stepped up. In April, Fukudamet
Hu Deping (son of Hu Yaobang) during his visit to Tokyo, while in July, he made a secret
visit to Beijing to discuss the possibility of a thaw in relations. Fukuda claimed that the
visit was arranged independently, but Yachi’s attendance at the meeting suggests this was
not the case (Asahi Shinbun, October 12, 2014). In his capacity as Boao Forum chair,
Fukuda made a further visit to Beijing on October 29 andmet Xi Jinping again, paving the
way for the November meeting between Abe and Xi. Fukuda’s dual roles as “China
friend” (informal) and chair of the Boao Forum (formal) enabled the Abe government to
check the signals coming from the Chinese leadership and test the water for a possible
rapprochement from a relatively safe distance. Similarly, for the Chinese government,
Fukuda was a useful conduit for communication with the Abe administration in the form
of someone who was trusted and of high symbolic value. While Fukuda was not the key
broker in repairing the relationship in 2014, his role cannot be completely ignored and
speaks to Fukuda’s own ambitions as the embracer of a long-held cause (stabilisation of
East Asian international relations) as well as a ﬁrst citizen.
How Ex is an Ex-Prime Minister?
The literature on informal political actors or hyper-empowered individuals, such as
former leaders, highlights several unoﬃcial resources and channels that can be leveraged
in their eﬀorts to continue exerting inﬂuence despite not holding oﬃcial positions of
power. In the context of international politics but with reference to national, institutional
structures, Cooper (2015, 99–123, 124–155) stresses the “iconic status” and name recog-
nition accorded to some ex-leaders by having served as high-proﬁle leaders of their
respective countries – with Nelson Mandela and Mikhail Gorbachev being obvious
examples. In addition, he highlights their contacts and resources both within and outside
the oﬃcial structures of government that result from their time as leader and points to
some examples of personal platforms established by leaders such as Clinton and Blair in
the form of eponymous foundations. He also refers to the “network power” by which ex-
leaders are embedded in global networks of mutually recognising elder statesmen such as
the IAC, Club of Madrid or The Elders. In the process of playing the role of political
dabbler, ﬁrst citizen and/or embracer of a cause, and seeking to exert inﬂuence,
Nakasone, Murayama and Fukuda have instrumentalised these resources and channels
(as well as others) to varying degrees and with diﬀerent outcomes.
Nakasone’s political dabbling, for example in his choice of successor(s) and inﬂuence
on policy, was in large part possible due to the nature of factional politics in the LDP, as
well as the authority and political capital he had accrued during his time in oﬃce. His
selection of Takeshita as his successor over the other two leadership candidates, Abe
Shintaro and Miyazawa Kiichi, was calculated “to maximize his inﬂuence over the new
prime minister and gain the most advantages for his faction” (Nester 1990, 175). In
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choosing Takeshita, Nakasone demonstrated his gratitude to the Tanaka/Takeshita
faction for their previous support since 1982, but at the same time reaped the beneﬁt
of ﬁve cabinet posts for his own faction in Takeshita’s government (Nester 1990, 175).
Nakasone’s policy concerns also steered his decision, since he saw Takeshita as the best
choice of candidate to implement his favoured consumption tax reform (Hattori
2015, 280).
The activities that Nakasone, Murayama and Fukuda have all undertaken with regard
to international or regional issues have highlighted their importance as symbolic and
well-connected ﬁgureheads involved in “marginal diplomacy.” Thus, Nakasone engaged
in shuttle diplomacy attempting to ﬁnd a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and Murayama led a delegation to North Korea in April 1999 prior to
Koizumi’s historic visit, demonstrating shades of Carter not only in relation to North
Korea but also in terms of salvaging a reputation as a perceived failed leader. Finally,
Fukuda has played an unoﬃcial role in trying to keep Sino-Japanese relations on track
since 2012. These continued (informal) political activities have often taken place behind
the scenes, in some cases aspiring to the role of a ﬁrst citizen and could be regarded as
such if they were more public.
Murayama and Fukuda are notable examples but there are surprisingly few former
prime ministers who have become ﬁrst citizens, certainly at the international level. One
reason for this is the general absence of network power. Even if globalisation is opening
opportunities for a range of hyper-empowered individuals to assume this role, Japanese
former prime ministers do not appear to be able or willing to take such roles. This
might be a matter of conﬁdence, language ability, or the predominantly Western
international system working against a latecomer like Japan, as it has done in the
United Nations Security Council (Drifte 2000). Fukuda seems to come the closest to
having achieved this, though his roles tend to be restricted to regional institutions
rather than international ones, with the exception of the IAC, and his low-key style
might obscure his impact.
Finally, the causes that all three former prime ministers have embraced since leaving
oﬃce have linked back in some cases to “unﬁnished business” during their time in oﬃce,
and their desire to bring about some sort of resolution or completion. Nakasone’s
enthusiastic support for constitutional revision continues through his think tank activ-
ities, regular press commentaries, and his inclusion in LDP discussions on the topic, while
both Murayama and Fukuda have continued their respective work on reconciliation in
East Asia. It should also be noted that an unsuccessful term in oﬃce does not necessarily
translate into obscurity. Murayama has probably been more successful (or at least more
proactive and less encumbered) as a former prime minister than a prime minister, and he
has been both persistent and consistent in pursuing some of the causes he took up during
his time in oﬃce. The same can be said of Fukuda. In the case of both, they have been able
to leverage their reputation –Murayama as originator of the 1995 apology, and Fukuda as
a trusted China friend – to address ongoing and divisive history-related problems in the
region. The relatively ﬂuid and informal nature of Japanese politics has aﬀorded former
prime ministers perceived to be failures a second act.
Political dabblers, ﬁrst citizens and embracers of a cause are all categories asso-
ciated with exerting informal inﬂuence that are taken from the extant literature,
having been proposed by Belenky and adapted by Theakston, and applied to Japan
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above. At the same time, this article has also shown that the Japanese case does not
completely map to some of the existing categories and in fact suggests new ones by
which former leaders continue to exert some inﬂuence, namely acolytes and
protégés, family aﬀair and celebrity (see Table 3). The high number of prime
ministerial acolytes and protégés can be attributed to the importance placed on
personalism in Japanese politics whereby personal connections and networks play a
key role in one’s career development. As Ward (1965, 71) pointed out some years
ago, a new politician will “join someone rather than something, [and] select a
protector and a leader rather than a cause.” This practice continues to this day,
even though the power of factions where these patron–client relationships played out
has diminished in recent years. For example, Abe’s protégé Inada Tomomi was
widely tipped to be Abe’s potential successor until she resigned as defence minister
in July 2017 over Self-Defence Forces cover-ups.
The “family aﬀair” category is also well represented in Japan, and speaks to the
relatively high percentage of second-, third-, fourth-, and even ﬁfth-generation politi-
cians (Aso Taro, for example) from whose ranks prime ministers have emerged.
Hereditary politicians or political dynasties are not unique to Japan, featuring in both
Western and Asian democracies (see Thompson 2012). Yet Japan is noteworthy because
of the marked increase in the number of such politicians from the 1980s (Krauss and
Pekkanen 2011, 43–44). In the 2009 general election just over 40% of LDP Diet
members were hereditary politicians, as were 13% of the DPJ. In subsequent elections,
Smith (2016, 118) shows that the LDP attempted to stem this tide by introducing open
recruitment contests, but still over 50% of Abe’s second cabinet was made up of
hereditary politicians (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December 26, 2012). The phenomenon
has been partly explained by political culture, in particular the need for a candidate to
have the “three ban” – a constituency (jiban), ﬁnance (kaban), and publicity/name
recognition (kanban). However, structural factors relating to the nature of the election
system and the strength of a candidate’s koenkai (support group) are also contributing
factors (see Ishibashi and Reed 1992; Fukuda 2009). The fact is that ten of Japan’s 25
LDP prime ministers between 1955 and 1993, and eight of the 13 (LDP and non-LDP)
prime ministers since 1993 have hailed from political dynasties (four with fathers or
grandfathers who were previous prime ministers). This suggests that family heritage
provides considerable political advantage (Hrebenar and Nakamura 2014, 15). In
addition, it provides an opportunity for former leaders’ reputations to be burnished
and legacies to be sustained by their children, grandchildren, nephews or brothers.
Finally, on “celebrity politics” the literature proposes two categories: (i) CP1, poli-
ticians who instrumentalise aspects of celebrity; and (ii) CP2, celebrities who enter the
world of politics (Street 2004, 437–439). In line with the former category, ex-leaders, by
virtue of having been leaders, are often automatically imbued with a degree of fame and
celebrity that can be translated into political capital after stepping down (Cooper 2008,
1–14). Murayama sought to leverage this status and capital to focus public attention on
a chosen cause when he made his ﬁlm acting debut at the age of 79 appearing in
Takahashi Iwao’s 8-gatsu no Kariyushi (Happiness in August) in 2003.3 Despite refusing
various approaches to appear in ﬁlms, Murayama eventually agreed to appear in this
ﬁlm set in Okinawa citing its anti-war message but also because the 1995 Okinawa Rape
Incident took place during his time as prime minister (Okinawa Taimsu, May 24, 2003).
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Murayama had to learn the Okinawan dialect to play an elderly wheelchair-bound man
who lost both legs in the Battle of Okinawa and is tasked with explaining some of the
young protagonist’s supernatural experiences. This stands in stark contrast to the
celebrity activities of Koizumi and Hatoyama mentioned above that appear to be
celebrity for celebrity’s sake and serve no discernible cause or end.
Concluding Remarks
There is clearly no established role for any leader of any country to play after retire-
ment, but this is especially so for the Japanese prime minister when compared with the
US president, who retains the title for life. However, this does not mean that Japanese
former prime ministers have ceased to exist and being an ex-prime minister does not
necessarily mean “you are very ex” (Daily Telegraph, June 24, 2007). The general
overview given above of what Japan’s post-war former prime ministers have done in
retirement and the three more detailed case studies represent the ﬁrst attempt to
highlight the post-premiership narrative of former prime ministers in Japan and
identify a range of activities. They also suggest a degree of suitability and transferability
in the extant categorisation, in particular those of still ambitious and exhausted
volcanoes. As regards continuing to exert inﬂuence, the categories of political dabblers,
ﬁrst citizens and embracers of a cause are useful in the Japanese case but require some
adaptation to take into account various norms and practices within the Japanese
political system. In particular, the presence of informal institutions, such as factions,
and the importance of personal connections help to explain the ways in which former
prime ministers have been able to continue to wield some power beyond their period in
oﬃce. This exploration of former Japanese prime ministers also suggests new categories
that can in turn be applied to the empirical data on ex-leaders elsewhere in the world.
For example, the acolytes and protégés category applies in the case of French President
Emmanuel Macron, elected in May 2017, who is regarded as an acolyte of his immedi-
ate predecessor François Hollande. The two Presidents Bush ﬁt the family aﬀair
category, and Blair’s many ﬁlm and television appearances put him in the celebrity
category.
A number of possible directions for future research can be identiﬁed. For example,
what are the conditions that shape a leader’s post-premiership? Does a successful or
unsuccessful term in oﬃce translate into success or failure post-premiership or is the
manner of resignation the determining factor? It also would be edifying to expand the
range of interviews beyond the 13 living former Japanese prime ministers to include the
bureaucrats, particularly from the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, who have had to work
with these individuals as they seek to take on the role of a ﬁrst citizen on a regional
basis or embrace a cause such as Asian reconciliation. Similarly, establishing and
exploring the perspectives of acolytes, protégés and family members who engage in
reputation burnishing provides another potential avenue of future research.
Is there an argument for institutionalising the role of former prime minister to
harness and beneﬁt from their experience and expertise? As the average age of leaders
drops and the number of former leaders increases, this is a valid question to ask. At this
point in time, they retain no formal position that recognises their status and there are
no plans afoot to introduce such a position. However, to an extent this is happening
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already in that the oﬃcial residences of some prime ministers (the Hatoyamas and
Yoshida in particular) memorialise their legacy as prime minister and, by default, their
position as former prime minister. However, this is occurring very much informally and
oﬀ-radar – rather like the ways in which Japanese prime ministers have continued to
play a role after stepping down.
Notes
1. Established in 2005, the forum is organised by Genron NPO, which also carries out joint
annual opinion polls with China Daily to gauge the shifts in perceptions between China and
Japan.
2. It is worth noting that Fukuda has not been the only former prime minister who has
played a proactive role in Sino-Japanese relations in recent years. Both Hatoyama Yukio
and Murayama Tomiichi have been outspoken critics of the revisionist tendencies of the
Abe government vis-à-vis the lingering history problems between China and Japan, and
their speeches and visits to China have drawn the positive attention of the Chinese
media.
3. A trailer for the ﬁlm is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K033kukWFaI.
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